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Introduction 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Africa has once again assumed the label of the 
“Dark Continent.” A satellite picture of the continent at night shows the disparity between 
electricity use in Africa as compared to other regions of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa 
consumes on average 350 kWh per capita compared to 3750 kWh for European nations. Only 
4 percent of rural Africans are connected to national electricity grids.1 In many African 
nations, the majority of this power derives from water. In recent decades, drought and 
increased water use have reduced the amount of hydropower available, while poor 
management and decaying infrastructure continue to hinder the production, transmission, and 
distribution of electricity. The 1990s saw the institution of power rationing in Ghana and 
Tanzania. In 2004, Uganda imposed a 12-hour a day load-shedding schedule. The recent 
power shortages in South Africa, a major exporter of electricity to neighboring countries, 
have left millions in the dark and the region’s lucrative mines at a standstill; the economic 
impact of the recent shortages will not be known for years. As oil prices rise, African nations 
and their international funders are once again looking to waterways as potential sources of 
power. 
The problems in electricity production and distribution in Africa derive from a 
confluence of geographical, economic, political, and ideological factors. But how much of 
the current electricity crisis is a legacy of colonial development policies? This paper 
addresses this question by examining the forces that shaped decisions about the development 
of electricity plants and hydropower dams in Britain’s African colonies.2 Prompted by 
wartime shortages and the need for postwar economic recovery, in 1917 the British 
government commissioned an Empire-wide survey of hydropower resources. The publication 
of the report in 1922 led to more systematic investigations of African waterways and 
electricity systems, which raised questions about the role of hydropower in spurring 
economic development. In contrast to Britain, the geography of the colonies seemed to favor 
hydropower over thermal sources. British engineers eyed the waters of the Nile, Volta, Tana, 
Rufiji, Shire, and Zambezi rivers as potential kilowatts of power. The taming of Africa’s 
rivers however offered more than an engineering challenge. Markets were needed for the 
                                                
1 Daniel Theuri, “Scaling Up Access to Energy Agenda: Decentralized Small Hydropower Schemes in 
Sub Sahara Africa,” African Development Bank (ADB) Finesse Africa Newsletter, April 2006. http://finesse-
africa.org/newsletter/200604/hp_africa.php. 
2 The terms water power, hydropower, and hydroelectricity all refer to electricity produced by the use of 
flowing water. For the sake of clarity, I will use the term hydropower.  
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power produced. What purpose should this electricity serve? And, whose responsibility was 
it to develop and manage power supplies—private industries, public utility companies, 
municipal authorities, or national governments?  
Debates about power production in British colonies were closely linked to those 
taking place in Great Britain. By the early twentieth century, Britain’s electricity system 
lagged behind that of other industrialized nations, thus threatening future industrial 
development. The majority of Britain’s power plants were fueled by coal, which was 
conveniently located near industrial centers. With the exception of the Scottish Highlands, 
few British waterways offered the possibility for large-scale hydropower development. In 
order to understand why electricity “made slow progress” in Britain, historians have 
examined the relationship between new technologies, institutions, and commercial interests.3 
Writing shortly after the nationalization of Britain’s electricity system in 1948, Henry Self 
and Elizabeth Watson traced the emergence of tensions between national and local 
management of power production and distribution.4 Leslie Hannah’s 1979 study similarly 
highlighted the conflicts between different models of electricity regulation and technologies 
in the pre-nationalization era.5 Adding to this discussion, Thomas P. Hughes compares 
Britain’s experience with that of the United States and Germany. He argues that electricity 
supply systems pass through distinct phases in their development—from the invention of 
technology and consideration of system models, to technology transfer and increased 
systemic growth and institutional development.6 Absent from this literature is an analysis of 
how these metropolitan experiences shaped decisions about colonial electricity supply 
systems or, conversely, how colonial experiences influenced the sector in Britain. As will be 
shown, debates over the role of the government and private industry in managing power 
supplies were not confined to the British Isles. Colonial administrators and engineers 
struggled to incorporate new technologies and institutions so as to meet colony, regional, and 
imperial needs. In addition, African colonies became a proving ground for British engineers 
and thus played an important part in the growth of Britain’s hydraulic engineering sector.  
Historians of Africa have focused little attention on the development of electricity 
supply systems. The scholarship on damming in Africa has generally focused on the 
environmental, social, and economic consequences of dam impoundment, especially the 
forced resettlement of upstream communities.7 As most large African dams were constructed 
                                                
3 I.C. Byatt, The British Electrical Industry, 1875–1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), vi. 
4 Henry Self and Elizabeth M. Watson, Electricity Supply in Great Britain: Its Development and 
Organization (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1952). 
5 Leslie Hannah, Electricity before Nationalisation: A Study of the Development of the Electricity Supply 
Industry in Britain to 1948 (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).  
6 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930 (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). 
7 See Elizabeth Colson, The Social Consequences of Resettlement: The Impact of the Kariba Resettlement 
upon the Gwembe Tonga (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971); Thayer Scudder, “River Basin 
Projects in Africa: Conservation vs. Development,” Environment 31, 2 (1989), 4–32; Thayer Scudder, “The 
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following the achievement of independence, the majority of these studies are situated in the 
postcolonial era. The exception is Kate Showers’s study of colonial and post-Apartheid water 
projects in Southern Africa.8 The following discussion builds upon this literature to analyze 
the investigation and construction of hydropower dams across Britain’s African empire, thus 
situating specific dam projects within a broader geographical and political context. 
To a certain extent, the specific geographical and political context of each colony 
shaped the planning of hydropower dams in Africa. But planners and engineers across 
Britain’s African empire and in London shared the assumption that Africans were unable to 
or uninterested in paying for electricity; the market for electricity was industry (mostly 
mining) and, in settler colonies, European residents. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, they 
were content to leave electricity production and distribution in the hands of private 
companies. By the late 1940s, as debates about control of power production in Britain took 
on more urgency, some engineers and administrators contested this approach and promoted 
the production of electricity as a public good. Influenced by international examples of river 
basin planning (such as the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States) and the 
nationalization of the electricity sector in Britain, these men argued for more government 
regulation of electricity supplies, the standardization of electricity policies, and integrated 
planning of large-scale hydropower projects. Challenging the assumption that Africans were 
not potential power consumers, they promoted rural electrification efforts. To a large extent, 
their efforts failed. As decolonization proceeded and the Cold War escalated in the 1950s, 
debates about hydropower dams assumed a more political tone.  
An examination of these debates and planning of hydropower dams makes evident the 
colonial roots of today’s power crises. The tendency for planners to focus on meeting 
existing industrial needs rather than developing new domestic markets among Africans 
postponed the construction of electricity plants. This was due in part to economic concerns; 
hydropower dams were expensive to construct and colonial coffers were empty. 
Technological capabilities also played a role. Without a long history of hydropower 
development in their home country, Britain’s engineering firms and manufacturing sector 
were not specialists in the field of hydraulic engineering. The colonial state preferred to leave 
the development of electricity supply systems to private utility companies and industries. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Human Ecology of Big Projects: River Basin Development and Resettlement,” Annual Review of Anthropology 
Vol. 2 (1973), 45–55; and Dzodzi Tsikata, Living in the Shadow of the Large Dams: Long Term Responses of 
Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana’s Volta River Project (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006); and 
Thayer Scudder, The Future of Large Dams: Dealing with the Social, Environmental, Institutional and Political 
Costs (London and Sterling, Virg.: Earthscan, 2005). For a detailed discussion of literature on damming in 
Africa, see Heather Hoag, “The Damming of Africa: The Spread of River Basin Planning in Postwar Africa,” in 
African Water Histories: Transdisciplinary Discourses, ed. Johann Tempelhoff (Vanderbijlpark, North-West 
University Press, South Africa, 2005), 171–183. 
8 Kate Showers, “Colonial and Post-Apartheid Water Projects in Southern Africa: Political Agendas and 
Environmental Consequences,” Working Papers in African Studies, No. 214 (Boston, MA: Boston University 
African Studies Center, 1998). 
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This continuation of the concession system further impeded the development of electricity 
systems in the colonies. With limited state investment in the electricity sector, the 
construction of hydropower dams was delayed. As African leaders assumed more political 
power in the late 1950s and 1960s, many of them were handed the blueprints for dams 
planned by their colonial predecessors.  
Hydrological Surveys of Imperial Waterways 
The First World War brought to the foreground the need for Britain to utilize the natural 
resources of its colonies for postwar economic recovery. At the war’s end, Britain found 
itself with a larger empire and a foreign and domestic debt that had increased ten-fold from 
pre-war levels. The wartime shortages had underscored the need for a nation to be resource 
self-sufficient. In 1917, the Imperial War Conferences recommended steps to allow Britain to 
“resist any pressure which a foreign Power or group of Powers could exercise in time of 
peace or during war.…”9 The key to postwar economic recovery, British planners argued, 
was the further development of Britain’s industrial sectors and the utilization of the natural 
resources of British colonies instead of those of its former enemies. The 1922 Report of the 
Water-Power Committee of the Conjoint of Scientific Societies expressed this sentiment: 
“The wealth embodied in its [Empire’s] mineral resources, its wheat areas, its forests, and the 
hundred products of its tropical dependencies, is almost incalculably great. But it must be 
realised that without an ample supply of cheap energy much of this wealth must always 
remain latent.”10 
Electricity was the key to developing the “latent” wealth of the colonies. The need for 
metal processing and fertilizer production during the war had made that evident. And 
although Britain was one of the world’s most industrialized nations, its electricity sector 
lagged behind that of other nations such as Germany and the United States. Describing 
London in 1913, the engineer Charles H. Merz lamented: “The largest city in the world offers 
an excellent example of what electric supply ought not to be.”11 At the outbreak of the war, 
London alone had sixty-five electrical utilities as well as numerous transmission, distribution, 
and pricing systems. Following the war, British planners addressed the haphazard regulation 
of existing electricity plants. Debate centered on the role of the state, municipal authorities, 
and private industry in electricity production and distribution. Rather than move towards a 
model of public ownership of electricity plants, throughout the 1920s British planners 
focused on coordinating the hundreds of small electricity plants in operation in Britain. In 
1919, Parliament passed the Electricity Supply Act, which established a committee of five 
commissioners charged with advising on the coordination of electricity production and 
                                                
9 Royal Commission on the Natural Resources, Trade and Legislation of Certain Portions of His 
Majesty’s Dominions, Final Report, 1917, quoted in Stephen Constantine, The Making of British Colonial 
Development Policy, 1914–1940 (London: F. Cass, 1984), 33.  
10 Dugald Clerk and A.H. Gibson, Water-Power in the British Empire: The Report of the Water-Power 
Committee of the Conjoint of Scientific Societies (London: Constable and Company, 1922), 1. 
11 Quoted in Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power, 227. 
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transmission. This was followed in 1926 with the creation of a Central Electricity Board, a 
public utility with powers to purchase electricity and sell it through a nationwide electricity 
grid; electricity production remained under private control.12  
 
Figure 1.  Africa’s waterways. Adapted by David Castro from W.M. Adams, Wasting the Rain: 
Rivers, Planning and People in Africa (Minnesota and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 18.  
                                                
12 John E. Robbins, Hydro-Electric Development in the British Empire (Toronto: MacMillan Company of 
Canada, 1931), 126. 
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In addition to regulating the power sector, the government set about investigating the 
best means of providing energy-consuming industries with steady power. Planners and 
engineers pointed to the finite supply of coal and oil as justifications for increased use of 
hydropower. Sir Dugald Clerk, the co-chairman of the Water-Power Committee, stressed the 
need for Britain to conserve its coal and oil reserves: “The coal position of the world, 
however, must deteriorate from decade to decade and it might be of advantage to consider 
our position in a coalless and oilless world.”13 The outbreak of a coal miners’ strike in 
Britain in 1919 further emphasized the problems of relying almost exclusively on coal to fuel 
British factories.14 The Water-Power Committee found the answer to this problem in the 
development of the Empire’s waterways. The prevalence of coal near Northern industrial 
centers in the British Isles, the small market for domestic power, and the long distances 
between potential hydropower sources and purchasers had limited the development of 
hydropower dams. By 1924, it was estimated that small hydropower plants mostly owned by 
factories or mills produced approximately 250,000 hp (186 MW) of Britain’s electricity in 
total.15  
The Committee noted that technological developments in electricity production and 
transmission and in manufacturing increased the viability of turning the Empire’s rivers to 
electricity. As fears of coal and oil shortages increased, improvements in hydraulic turbines, 
electric generators, and transmission lines made hydropower production more efficient and 
cost effective. By the 1920s, it was possible to transmit electricity over a distance of 200 
miles, making the remoteness of potential hydropower sources less of a limiting factor.16 
This had allowed for the electrification of railways in the United States and in France.17 
Advances in metal-processing and fertilizer production had also increased the demand for 
electricity. For example, some British planners suggested that by 1940 the global 
consumption of fertilizer would nearly double.18 Such technological developments and 
energy forecasts led many British planners to investigate the most economic means to 
produce and distribute electricity within Britain and her Empire. By the mid-1920s, more 
planners found the answer to Britain’s postwar recovery in the damming of British and 
imperial waterways for power production.19  
An almost complete lack of information on imperial waterways confronted engineers 
and planners. The establishment of the Water-Power Committee of the Conjoint Scientific 
Societies in November of 1917 was the first step in collecting the geographical and 
                                                
13 Clerk and Gibson, Water-Power in the British Empire, v–iv. 
14 Hughes, Networks of Power, 351. 
15 Robbins, Hydro-Electric Development in the British Empire, 121. 
16 British National Archives (hereafter BNA), CO 267/620 Hydro-Electric Power in Sierra Leone, 1927. 
17 Clerk and Gibson, Water-Power in the British Empire, 6.  
18 Ibid., 5–6. 
19 For Great Britain, these efforts focused on the Scottish Highlands. See Hannah, Electricity before 
Nationalisation, 129–31; Self and Watson, Electricity Supply in Great Britain, 64–67. 
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hydrological data on Britain’s nascent hydropower sector. The Committee collected data on 
existing hydropower plants and hydropower potential throughout the British Empire. The 
Committee published its report in 1922, thus providing the first comprehensive survey of 
Britain’s hydropower sector. What the Committee found was dismal. Of the estimated 75 
million horsepower (56 GW) used throughout the world, Britain used about 13 million hp (10 
GW), compared to Continental Europe which used 24 million hp (18 GW) and the United 
States, which used 29 million hp (21.5 GW). British dominions and colonies only consumed 
an estimated 6 million hp (4.5 GW) of electricity.20 The Committee estimated that 15–16 
million hp (11–12 GW) of the world’s electricity derived from hydropower. The differences 
in use of hydropower between Britain and its European neighbors were striking. The 
prevalence of coal to centers of production in Britain meant that only 0.6 percent of its power 
came from water, while Continental Europe received 27 percent from hydropower. The 
potential hydropower in the Empire was estimated at 70 million continuous horsepower (5 
GW).21 The Committee found that, “The Empire’s position in water-power development at 
the present time compares unfavourably with that of its commercial competitors.”22  
The dearth of reliable information on colonial waterways meant that the Committee’s 
estimates of potential hydropower were “highly speculative.”23 Few hydropower stations 
were in operation in Britain’s African colonies. For example, at the time of the survey, only 
three 2,000 hp (1.5 MW) projects were in development in Kenya. In the Union of South 
Africa, the potential areas for development were the Vaal and Orange Rivers and the Mooi 
River in Natal and Transvaal. Although the potential hydropower sites were remotely 
located, the Rhodesias offered far more possibilities. It was estimated that 220,000 hp existed 
(164 MW), 75,000 hp (5.6 MW) from Victoria Falls alone.24 The Committee devoted only 
one paragraph to West Africa, noting the potential development of 250,000 hp (186 MW) on 
the Volta River in the Gold Coast and between 240,000 and 260,000 hp (179–194 MW) in 
Nigeria.25 The Committee concluded: “The economic development of many of our tropical 
dependencies, whose latent wealth is practically untapped, is directly interconnected with the 
development of their water-power resources.”26 
With little development to date, the Committee focused its discussion on potential 
hydropower sources and the need for hydrological investigations of colonial waterways. This 
process had begun prior to the war’s end. After surveying the Volta River in 1915, Albert 
Kitson, director of the Geological Survey Department of the Gold Coast, had proposed the 
development of a hydropower dam on the Volta at Ajena. In 1917 and 1918 respectively, 
                                                
20 Clerk and Gibson, Water-Power in the British Empire, viii. 
21 Ibid., vii–xi. 13–14. 
22 Ibid., 13–14. 
23 Ibid., 4. 
24 Ibid., 36–37. 
25 Ibid., 37. 
26 Ibid., 2. 
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hydrological surveys were planned for the Union of South Africa and East African 
Protectorate of Kenya. In Asia, a hydrological survey of Indian water sources began in 
1919.27 The Committee urged the British government to step up these efforts and embark on 
a “close systematic investigation of all reasonably promising water-powers, and of their 
economic possibilities.”28 To facilitate this the Committee proposed the establishment of an 
“Imperial Water-Power Board” or “Conservation Commission” that would act as an advisory 
coordinating board on hydrological investigations and development within the Empire. They 
suggested an Imperial Water-Power Conference be held in London as well as the 
centralization of all information on the Empire’s hydrological resources at the Board’s 
London headquarters. The Committee also recommended that the British government offer 
financial assistance in developing hydropower, as this would in turn attract private capital. So 
as to promote this development and decrease reliance on non-British engineers, the 
Committee proposed increasing support for engineering programs within Britain so “that the 
engineers of Great Britain should be prepared to take a commensurate part of such 
development.”29 
The Committee’s report emphasized the lack of information on and development of 
African waterways. In Southern Africa, irregular rainfall and stream flow limited the 
development of its water resources. In the Union of South Africa, the presence of coal 
allowed for the development of steam plants. At the time of the survey, there were 33 small 
hydropower stations in existence, supplying a total of 1000 kW. A 1920 survey of the 
Orange-Vaal river system by South Africa’s Director of Irrigation, F.E. Kanthack, found 
8100 hp (6 MW) available, but at the expense of £112 to £291 per horsepower. He concluded 
that “considering the abundance of cheap coal within easy reach of this area, the commercial 
exploitation of water power on the Vaal River, even under much more favourable working 
conditions than those assumed is very unlikely.”30 In 1928, the 1350 kW Sabie hydroelectric 
plant began supplying power to three mining companies.31  
In 1931, the Broken Hill Development Company operated the only hydropower plant 
in Northern Rhodesia; the 15 MW hydropower plant on the Mulungushi River supplied 
power to the company’s zinc plant.32 In Southern Rhodesia, discussion centered on the 
development of Victoria Falls to support South African mines; however, the technical 
capacity to transmit the power from the source to the mines (a distance of 700 miles) did not 
yet exist. Municipally owned coal and wood-burning plants supplied the colony’s five main 
towns of Salisbury, Buluwayo, Gwelo, Umtali, and Gatooma. The Acting Chief Secretary of 
Nyasaland summed up the key factor in hydropower development in Southern Africa in the 
                                                
27 Robbins, Hydro-Electric Development in the British Empire, 24.  
28 Clerk and Gibson, Water-Power in the British Empire, 50. 
29 Ibid., 51. 
30 Quoted in Robbins, Hydro-Electric Development in the British Empire, 4. 
31 Robbins, Hydro-Electric Development in the British, 1–5. 
32 Ibid., 9. 
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1920s: “These resources are so greatly in excess of any development that can at present be 
foreseen and for which they could be used, that the present policy is to examine each 
proposal on its own merits. Development has not yet reached a stage where it could be said 
that any considerable market for power is in sight.”33  
The Water-Power Committee was not surprised by the limited development of water 
resources in colonies; neither did they find the lack of coordination shocking as the situation 
seemed to mirror that present in the British Isles. Their report however drew attention to the 
need for more intensive hydrological investigations of colonial resources. This process, they 
argued, should be coordinated at the imperial and, in the cases where rivers traversed 
multiple colonies such as in East Africa, the regional level. The Colonial Office met this 
suggestion with skepticism. In 1921, Douglas Spencer, the manager of the W.G. Armstrong 
Whitworth’s Company, wrote to the Colonial Office proposing the systemization and 
centralization of the investigation of hydropower potential within the Empire. One official 
responded:  
The circumstances of each Colony or Protectorate are quite different. You cannot 
pool the water power of the whole Empire, and it is of little use to know water power 
is running to waste in a Colony if there is nothing particular to do with the water 
power when you have got it.[…] First of all find something locally for which we want 
the power most.34 
Other administrators accused Spencer of simply trying to find work and suggested that such a 
centralized process could result in one or two companies receiving a monopoly for 
hydropower development. In order to avoid this from happening, they suggested that 
potential hydropower projects needed to come from individual colonies. If a colonial 
government or “responsible persons interested in the development of a particular colony” 
found that hydropower was economically feasible and there was a market for the power 
produced, only then should an engineer be commissioned to investigate.35  
The reaction of the Colonial Office to the Water-Power Committee’s and Spencer’s 
proposal for Empire-wide coordination reflected the hands-off approach to hydropower 
development. In Britain’s African colonies, few hydropower stations were in existence. 
Those that did exist were owned and operated by individual companies. Rather than investing 
scarce funds into hydropower dams and electrical power stations, colonial governments opted 
to grant concessions to individual companies for the development of water resources for 
specific industries. This approach was in line with British attempts to govern their colonies 
“on the cheap.”36 The limited demand for electricity for domestic and industrial use made 
investing public funds in electricity projects financially risky. The answer was the concession 
                                                
33 Quoted in Robbins, Hydro-Electric Development in the British Empire, 11. 
34 BNA CO 323/885/481, “Water Power Development in British Empire,” File notes, 1921. 
35 BNA CO 323/885/482, “Water Power Development in British Empire,” File notes, 1921. 
36 For a discussion of British colonial policy, see Constantine, The Making of British Colonial 
Development Policy, 1914–1940. 
10     Heather Hoag 
 
system. Like their counterparts in Britain, Africa-based administrators preferred to let private 
capital develop electricity plants, including hydropower sources. Without taking on any 
financial burden, the government received revenue in the form of rent and taxes paid by the 
concessionaire as well as the option to purchase electricity.  
Many of these early concessions were granted to mining interests such as the 
Northern Nigeria Tin Mines. In August of 1923, an agreement was reached between the 
colonial administration and the mining company over the use of the Kwall Falls on the N’gell 
River. The company was granted a forty-five-year concession to construct and operate a 
hydropower station at the falls. Upon payment of rent, the company had all rights to the 
electricity produced but could be required to sell to the government a limited amount of 
power (not to exceed 5 percent of the total amount generated). The agreement stipulated that 
the company was responsible for the environmental damage their activities caused, stating all 
water used must be returned to the N’Gell River “free from chemical or other pollution.” A 
similar agreement was made between Northern Rhodesia Government and Rhodesia Broken 
Hill Mine.37 
These concession agreements reflect the concern administrators had regarding the 
economic benefits of investing in electricity plants. These ventures were small-scale in terms 
of size and financial risk. For example, after transmission the Kwall Falls station provided 
the mines with only 2,200 volts of electricity. The cost of this was entirely assumed by the 
company. As such, projects were based on proximity to the resources (usually mines) and not 
near centers of population. Power was produced almost exclusively for industry with a 
limited amount being offered for sale to the colonial administration and European settlers. 
From the perspective of colonial officials, the key market for power in African colonies was 
industry. Some colonies did explore the costs and benefits of electrifying railways. In 1927, 
Lieutenant-Colonial J.H. Patterson, an engineer with experience in East Africa, suggested 
that Sierra Leone’s Sewa River be utilized for the production of electricity for Freetown and 
the Sierra Leone railways. In response to the proposal, the engineering firm of Preece, 
Cardew and Snell found “that there was no serious difficulty from an electrical point of view, 
but the expense would be considerable and the financial success must depend on the market 
for electrical power.” The engineers found that if a market for 1,000 hp [746 kW] could be 
found in and around Freetown, the scheme could be profitable. They also expressed 
optimism as to the ability of the scheme to provide both “a supply of electricity for lighting 
and for power” which would “result in the springing up of industrial works.”38 The 
engineers’ findings did not sway colonial officials who found the scheme “commercially 
unsound.” One administrator referred to the scheme as “quite wild;” another responded to it 
as “madness.”39  
                                                
37 BNA CO 111/685/8, “Agreement between Nigeria and Northern Nigeria Tin Mines (Bauchi),” 31 
August 1923.  
38 BNA CO 267/620, Letter from Preece, Cardew and Snell to Colonial Office, 1927. 
39 BNA CO 267/620, Hydro-Electric Power in Sierra Leone, File notes, 1927.  
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In areas where environmental conditions favored hydropower development, the 
increasing presence of European settlers influenced the decisions on electricity development. 
The ideology of the day presented Africans as uninterested in electricity. Portrayed as 
‘traditional’ or ‘primitive,’ Africans were not seen as potential consumers of electricity. 
Industry, railways, and European settlers were the target market. A 1931 survey of Empire 
hydropower completed by John Robbins of Canada’s MacMaster University underscored this 
attitude. Robbins derived his conclusions from a reading of existing hydrological surveys and 
on the opinions of colony-based administrators where such data was absent. In Basutoland, 
Robbins found that while possible sites for hydropower production existed, there was a 
limited need, as “European interests are negligible.”40 Similarly in Swaziland, he found little 
demand for electricity “owing, however, to the fact that this territory, with an area of 6,704 
square miles, has a European population of about 3,000, there appear to be few purposes for 
which electricity could be put to use, as the population is a very scattered one.”41 The attitude 
that Africans were not likely consumers reached outside Southern Africa. In Uganda, 
Robbins found that “for the preponderating majority of the people, the Africans, are not 
potential customers,” thus public investment in hydropower a waste of scarce development 
funds.42  
Although Africans may not have been perceived as potential customers, colonial 
administrators did not entirely dismiss their needs. Concession agreements often included the 
acknowledgement and protection of African rights to waterways. Clause iv of the agreement 
for the N’Gell River plant mandated that the Northern Nigeria Tin Company “allow any 
native community which has hitherto been dependent on the N’Gell River to obtain a supply 
of water for their reasonable requirements and shall if required by the Governor provide such 
facilities as the Governor may direct.”43 The damming of the Lunsemfwa River in Northern 
Rhodesia offers another example of this. In 1929, District Commissioner J. Gordon Read met 
with Chief Mukonchi of Mpinga to discuss the possible impact of the dam on the village’s 
seventy-four residents. Read found Mukonchi to be in general support of the proposed 
development, reporting “I asked Chief Mukonchi to express himself freely on the subject and 
as he has known me for ten years I believe that he has expressed his real feelings on this 
occasion. He welcomes the proposed dam provided his existing rights are protected.” In 
addition to compensation for the loss of land to inundation, Mukonchi requested that the 
villagers’ be able to draw water from the dam and river, and fish, use boats, and shoot in the 
dam area. In the hopes of removing “any possible trace in the minds of the natives that the 
Government (for practical purposes the District Commissioner) had been guilty of deception 
                                                
40 Robbins, Hydro-Electric Development in the British Empire, 10. 
41 Ibid., 10. 
42 Ibid., 13. 
43 BNA CO 111/685/8, Agreement between Nigeria and Northern Nigeria Tin Mines (Bauchi), 31 August 
1923.  
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or craftiness,” Read suggested all money received from the concessionaire be deposited into 
the Native Reserves Fund.”44  
With limited funds or manpower available for infrastructure projects, administrators 
paid little attention to the development of hydropower resources. Owing to the location of 
potential hydropower sites and the dismissal of Africans as consumers, they preferred to 
grant concessions for small-scale hydropower projects to companies and individuals. While 
they did not view Africans as potential consumers, district administrators did take into 
account the impact such projects may have on African communities. Concerned that such 
projects might negatively affect relations between administrators and African communities, 
many district administrators did not promote increased hydropower development. What 
interest there was in hydropower development during the 1920s emanated not from the 
Empire, but from British engineers. The 1922 Water-Power Committee report and Robbins’s 
1931 survey drew attention to the possibilities for greater use of imperial waterways. 
Although demand for electricity remained low in most colonies, many engineers believed 
that increased electricity production would spur industrial growth. The groundwork had been 
laid for more investment and attention to water power.  
Investigating and Controlling Africa’s Waters 
The Nile River and her tributaries offered some of the most promising sites for hydropower 
development in Britain’s African colonies. In 1907, Winston Churchill, the then Under-
Secretary of State for the Colonies, visited Uganda. He recounted in his autobiography My 
African Journey: 
We must have spent three hours watching the waters and revolving plans to harness 
and bridle them. So much power running to waste, such a coign of vantage 
unoccupied, such a lever to control the natural forces of Africa ungripped, cannot but 
vex and stimulate imagination. And what fun to make the immemorial Nile begin its 
journey by driving through a turbine!45 
Churchill’s dream of converting the Nile’s waters into power would wait. The first priority of 
colonial planners was agricultural development. In 1925, the Sennar Dam was built at Gezira 
in the Sudan to provide water for irrigation needs. Administered by a private British firm, the 
Sudan Plantations Syndicate, the scheme used Nile waters and mechanical inputs, namely 
tractors, dams, and airplanes for spraying, to cultivate cotton for English mills.46 
By the 1930s, discussions of the “proper use” of waterways became a dominant 
theme in economic planning. What role did water play in the development of a nation’s 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors? How should such a valuable resource be managed? 
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In the United States, conservationists, supported by President Theodore Roosevelt, 
publicized the exhaustible nature of the country’s water supplies and lobbied for their 
efficient and rational use. The continued industrialization of North America and Europe 
during the early 20th century further emphasized the finite supply of water resources. 
Multipurpose river-basin projects operated or were planned on most large North American 
and European rivers. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a public corporation 
established as part of the New Deal, epitomized a model of public resource management, 
rural electrification, and multipurpose river planning. Upon its formation in 1933, President 
Franklin Roosevelt charged the TVA with “the broadest duty of planning for the proper use, 
conservation, and development of the natural resources of the Tennessee River drainage 
basin and its adjoining territory for the general social and economic welfare of the nation.”47 
The Authority’s responsibilities included the development and maintenance of dams and 
power stations, transmission of hydroelectric power, flood control facilities, navigation 
channels, and reforestation and erosion programs for the entire Tennessee Valley 
watershed.48 
The TVA emerged at a time of increased anxiety about the state of rural America. To 
conservationists and many policy makers, soil erosion, deforestation, and bad land 
management were intimately connected to rural poverty. Nowhere was this more evident 
than in the American South. Social scientists presented the South as a “colonial economy”—
a region whose wealth was exported to Northern industrial centers. The development of the 
North, New Dealers argued, had come at the expense of southern farmers. During the 1920s, 
the per capita income of southern states was less than half the national average. 
Conservationists and New Dealers found the solution to this disparity in the proper use and 
equitable distribution of the nation’s natural resources. The TVA sought to jumpstart this 
process in the South by embarking on a massive rural electrification program. The primary 
objective of the program was the provision of hydropower from the TVA’s many dams to 
rural communities and small industries. Supporters argued that by providing electricity to the 
region’s poor, rural farms, and towns, farmers’ buying power would increase and, eventually, 
the colonial relationship would be severed. Hydropower, the linchpin to TVA-style regional 
development, was recast as a public good and as such necessitated greater government 
regulation.49 
British planners followed closely the development of the TVA and other 
multipurpose river-basin projects. With the vast resources of its tropical colonies practically 
undeveloped, however, most did not embrace the conservationist ethic to the extent their 
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American counterparts did. They too, as discussed below, were increasingly concerned about 
the management of natural resources. But they were less focused on rural poverty in African 
communities. Unlike the architects of the TVA, British planners were indeed trying to 
manage colonial economies. Their fundamental goal remained the redistribution of economic 
resources from their colonies to Britain. Most remained unconcerned with addressing the 
disparity in living conditions between rural and urban regions or between African and 
European residents. Like their North American counterparts, however, they advocated 
greater control over infrastructure development and regulation, areas seen as crucial to the 
continued development of natural resources in Britain’s colonies. In 1929, the British 
Parliament passed the first Colonial Development Act, which provided £1 million per year to 
support economic development projects in Britain’s colonies. In 1940 and again in 1946, the 
British Parliament passed new Acts that increased funding for colonial development to £5 
million and then to £12 million per year.50 With more funding available, colonial 
administrators were able to more directly affect the course of development in the colonies.  
In African colonies, administrators took on a more activist role in managing 
environmental resources. This increased involvement in the affairs of rural Africans seemed 
justified by the dominant narrative of the day. To many administrators, environmental 
mismanagement and increasing population had resulted in soil erosion, food insecurity, and 
increased urban migration. In this degradation narrative, African farmers and pastoralists 
needed the guiding hand of Western science to better manage their resources; British 
paternalism after all ruled the day. One example from Kenya serves to illustrate this point.51 
In the Marakwet Escarpment of Kenya, William Adams has shown that many colonial agents 
recognized the importance of the local irrigation system in preventing famine.52 During the 
1930s, this predominantly positive, and in some respects admiring, conception of indigenous 
technology gave way to a more “disparaging view.” As colonial experts lost confidence in 
the Marakwet’s ability to produce sufficient food crops, they forced residents to plant 
drought-resistant crops like cassava. Reacting against the “feckless way” the Marakwet 
managed their irrigation and agricultural systems (to the outsider the furrows appeared to be 
strewn haphazardly down the mountain), colonial agents embarked on a massive soil 
conservation campaign and advocated the realignment of the irrigation furrows.53  
                                                
50 J.D. Fage, A History of Africa, 3rd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 422. 
51 For other examples of increased interest on the part of colonial administrators in African environmental 
management systems, see David Anderson, “Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought: The Colonial 
State and Soil Conservation in East Africa during the 1930s,” African Affairs 83 (1984), 321–43; and David 
Anderson, Eroding the Commons: The Politics of Ecology in Baringo, Kenya, 1890–1963 (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, and Oxford: James Currey, 2002). 
52 W.M. Adams, “Irrigation, Erosion, and Famine: Visions of Environmental Change in Marakwet, 
Kenya,” in The Lie of the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment, edited by Melissa 
Leach and Robin Mearns (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann; Oxford: James Currey; London: International African 
Institute, 1996). 
53 Ibid., 162. 
Damming the Empire     15 
 
Colonial administrations not only devoted more attention to rural development and 
environmental management. In East Africa, the confluence of a more interventionist colonial 
state with its cadre of experts, the rise of multipurpose river basin planning models, and 
increased demand for electricity set the stage for heated debate over the role of the state in 
the electricity sector. Through the granting of government concessions, one company, the 
East African Power and Lighting Company Ltd. (EAPLC), produced, distributed, and sold 
the majority of electricity in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika. It was the holding company 
for Uganda’s Electric Light and Power Supply Company (based in Kampala) as well as 
Tanganyika’s Dar es Salaam and District Electric Supply Company Ltd (DARESCO) and 
Tanganyika Electric Supply Company (TANESCO).  
Beginning in the early 1930s, some European settlers, British engineers, and colonial 
administrators begin to challenge the monopoly of the EAPLC. In Uganda, increasing 
demand for electricity by mining interests near Jinja and the urban centers of Kampala and 
Entebbe turned planners’ attention to the development of hydropower-producing dams. 
Officials of the Electric Light and Power Supply Company and colonial administrators 
weighed the costs and benefits of building a dam at one of three sites: Ripon Falls, Owen 
Falls, and Murchison Falls. Skeptical that enough information existed on Owen Falls and 
Murchison Falls, Uganda’s governor lobbied for the development of a 1000 kW hydropower 
plant at Ripon Falls. He argued that a limited power market existed to justify substantial 
financial investment into surveys for the all three sites. Regardless of the governor’s 
objection, in 1934, the Ugandan government sought tenders “for the right to develop water 
power on any river for the purpose of supplying electricity.” The agreement stipulated that 
these developments not restrict the full development of the sites at a later time.54  
The governor’s decision to advocate for the smaller Ripon Falls project stemmed 
from concerns over the limited market for electricity as well as British paternalism. Ugandan 
officials stressed the absence of permanent European residents in the Protectorate would 
extremely limit paying domestic consumers. Industry remained the key market. However, the 
Governor believed that the role of the colonial state was not the promotion of 
industrialization. A.H. Naylor, who was appointed in 1934 to investigate Uganda’s 
hydropower possibilities, recalled: 
The Governor of Uganda at that time, Sir Bernard Bourdillon, had impressed on them 
that Uganda was a protectorate, and that it was not the Government’s policy to have 
the country industrialized because of the fear of causing discontent amongst the 
natives and taking labour away from essential areas….55  
Paternalism on the part of Governor Bourdillon towards Africans in Uganda led to the 
continuation of the belief that the “traditionalism” of Africans was somehow at odds with 
both industrial development and the consumption of electricity.  
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Engineers involved in these discussions focused less on the social consequences of 
industrialization and more on the technical possibilities for hydropower development in 
Uganda. They estimated that at least 50,000 hp (37 MW) could be developed in Uganda. 
Their interest lay downstream from Ripon Falls at Owen Falls. Feeling that the Governor was 
rushing a decision and, by advocating development of the smaller Ripon Falls, limiting the 
amount of electricity produced, they urged “that it would be premature to grant any 
concession until the precise conditions are better known.”56  
Both engineers and colonial administrators recognized that present demand for power 
did not necessitate a large hydropower project in Uganda; however, they did anticipate that 
the expansion of the mining sector and urban population would continue, justifying the 
development of a project in the future. In 1936, after conducting a survey of the area of the 
Victoria Nile near Jinja, consulting engineers for the Electric Light and Power Supply 
Company found that building a steam plant near Kampala and one near Jinja was the most 
commercially feasible route—for the time being. Believing that the demand for electricity 
would increase in the near future, the company requested they receive the first right of refusal 
when such a hydropower project was deemed commercially viable. The government granted 
the company a five-year guarantee.57  
The debate over the development of Ripon Falls or Owen Falls in Uganda illustrates 
the increasing attention on the part of colonial administrators towards hydropower 
development. While some attitudes remained firm, such as the assumption that Africans were 
not interested or would not benefit from electricity, it is during this period that the first real 
investigation and analysis of hydropower development in Uganda occurred. Influenced by 
international river basin planning efforts and the publication of Empire-wide surveys, 
administrators and engineers weighed the costs and benefits of hydropower development. 
Colonial and company officials alike called for the collection of more specific information on 
potential sites prior to the planning of large-scale projects. This led to a more concerted effort 
to survey the Nile basin waterways and geography. In 1935, the Crown Agents requested that 
a hydrological section of Uganda Land and Survey Department be established to coordinate 
the gauging of the Protectorate’s waterways.58 This concern was shared by the company’s 
engineers who argued that the increased collection of stream flow data on the Victoria Nile 
would mean that planning of hydropower stations and other water-consuming activities 
“could take place on agreed facts.”59  
The debate also highlighted increasing tensions between the colonial state and the 
electricity company over planning for Uganda’s future needs. Forecasting electricity demand 
was difficult. Should Uganda pursue a project large enough to supply both industrial and 
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urban demand for decades to come? Or, with present demand limited, should the strategy be 
to develop smaller hydropower sources in conjunction with steam and oil plants?  
 
     Figure 2.  East African waterways.  (Map by David Castro) 
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As administrators debated the costs and benefits of large-scale hydropower 
development in Uganda, a conflict was brewing in Kenya over the monopoly of the East 
African Power and Lighting Company. Electricity production in Kenya was almost 
completely under the control of the company, which began producing power for agricultural 
and domestic use in 1908 with a steam plant and small hydropower facility on the Ruira 
River. The company expanded its production in 1925 with a 2,000 kW plant on the Thika 
River. Inconsistent stream flow during the dry season led the company to augment this 
supply with a steam plant in 1928 (adding 510 kW capacity). The company also managed 
three oil-run plants in Mombasa (combined capacity of 750 kW). The only other notable 
electricity plant in 1930 was a 460 hp (343 kW) hydropower plant on the Maragua River 
operated by the Maragua Electric Supply Company; this power was sold to nearby sisal 
plantations.60 
Throughout the 1930s, the East African Power and Lighting Company struggled to 
meet the increasing demand for electricity in the region. Table 1 shows the increase in 
demand in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam between 1931 and 1948. In 1934, EAPLC officials 
predicted that as early as October 1935 power rationing might be needed unless further 
electrical plants were developed.61 Like their counterparts in Uganda, Kenyan authorities 
grappled with the best means to meet the growing demand for electricity. Seen as a “matter 
of considerable urgency,” colonial administrators and company officials searched for the 
most optimal site for a hydropower dam.62 In 1934, the company petitioned the Kenya 
government for permission to develop a project on the Tana and Maragua rivers. Two sites 
came under consideration—the confluence of the Tana and Maragua rivers and Seven Forks 
on the lower Tana River. The company preferred the first site; they claimed that a seventy-
foot dam with a minimum flow of 450 cusecs (cubic feet per second) of stream flow produce 
about 10,000 hp (7.5 MW). Impoundment, the company projected, would flood an area of 
1,200–1,500 acres of Native Reserve “occupied by a few natives.”63 Colonial administrators 
challenged this view, claiming that the Tana-Maragua scheme would flood an area of land 
under “beneficial native occupation.” They suggested that an examination of the Seven Forks 
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Table 1: Increase in demand for electricity in East Africa 
 Demand (in kW) Units Sold (in millions) 
 Nairobi Dar es Salaam Nairobi Dar es Salaam 
1931 1500 200 4.5 1.0 
1939 3000 1185 13 3 
1948 10500 2050 38 6 
Source: “Problems and Prospects of Electricity in Tanganyika,” Tanganyika Standard, 16 June 1949.  
After a 1935 report by the company’s consulting engineers found the Tana-Maragua 
scheme was the better of the two due to its capacity for water storage and its proximity to 
Nairobi, the government supported the project. But before planning and construction could 
begin, the company sought an extension of its concession from 1947 (which it was granted in 
1922) until 1972. The company maintained that an extension of its license was necessary to 
facilitate raising capital on the London markets. In support of their request, the company 
cited a number of other cases in which the British government granted companies longer 
concession periods, including the Palestine Electric Corporation, Ltd. (71 years with 
government option to purchase after 41 years); Jerusalem Electric and Public Service Corp. 
Ltd. (45 years with option to extend for 16 more years); Burma Electric Supply Company Ltd 
(50 years from 1928); Dar es Salaam and District Electric Supply Company Ltd (80 years 
with government option to buy after 50 years); and Tanzania Electric Supply Company’s 
Pangani Concession (60 years with option to extend for 15 years and government to purchase 
after 50 years).65  
The company’s request did not fall on deaf ears. One sympathetic colonial official 
explained its position: 
If it is decided to let their licences come to an end and not renew them, then, in order 
to safeguard their shareholders, they would have to proceed to increase charges, build 
up reserves, do no development work and keep maintenance down to the minimum 
necessary. This would hardly be to the good of anybody.… Be that as it may, 
however, the local attitude is probably not without its own measure of justification in 
local eyes.66  
The “local eyes” referred to were those of British settlers in Kenya. A mistake in the drafting 
of an amended Electric Power Ordinance in 1934 had opened the door for settler challenges 
to the company. The Ordinance had erroneously included a proviso stipulating that the 
amending of the ordinance could not be done “in defiance of the wishes of an local authority 
affected….”67 In February of 1936 British residents in Nairobi, represented by the Nairobi 
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Municipal Council, objected to the monopoly granted the company for the city’s power 
supply. Dissatisfied with the company, council members argued that meter rates and 
maximum prices stipulated in the application were too high. Similarly, they contended that 
the maximum dividends payable to the company were excessive and should be limited to 10 
percent per year. They found the use of overhead power lines in residential areas 
“unsatisfactory, unsightly and dangerous” and requested that they be replaced with 
underground cables. In effect, the residents had little sympathy for the company’s claims that 
without an extension they would not be able to adequately expand, maintain, and distribute 
the power needed by Nairobi residents. To this, the council responded that the company’s 
predicament “is due to the failure of the Company to adopt measures to prevent such a 
position.”68  
Regardless of its support for the company’s plans to develop the Tana-Maragua 
project, the Kenya government found itself unable to approve the project. In exasperation, 
one official wrote:  
This is distinctly annoying. The municipalities appear to be taking advantage of an 
admitted drafting error in an Ordinance which conferred upon them “rights” which it 
was never intended that they should have and which, in my opinion, it is quite 
improper that they should possess. The “rights” in question are the right to apply to 
revoke the license granted to a private undertaking or company at any time.69  
The Municipal Council was not alone in challenging the company’s plans. In April 1936, a 
group of European settlers along the Maragua Ridge sent a letter to the government stating 
their concerns. They argued that the Tana-Maragua project would negatively impact the 
value of their property and their quality of life. The resettlement of Africans displaced by the 
project to land adjacent to the ridge would “render their farms practically valueless and 
involve a danger from the spread of disease through the trespass of native cattle and the 
insanitary (sic) habits of natives themselves.” They predicted that European women and 
children would also come under physical threat of violence from their new neighbors. The 
company ignored the settlers’ concerns, opting not to meet with the settlers’ advocates.70  
While the company was not willing to negotiate with the settlers, the Kenya 
government could not ignore their demands. In May of 1936 Kenya’s governor wrote to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies explaining the settlers’ concerns:  
We are not suggesting that the Electric Light Coy. [EAPLC] should not receive 
assistance in any way of its schemes or development but it is a wealthy corporation, 
holding a very valuable monoply (sic) and we certainly contend that if it is to be 
allowed to flood areas occupied by natives for its own purposes even although also in 
the public interest, arrangements should be made for the settlement of the natives who 
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will be dispossessed in such a manner as not to unduly interfere with the interests of 
individual settlers, who find it hard enough to carry on without further difficulties 
presented to them.71 
The support of the governor to settlers’ concerns and the prolonged debate over the extension 
of the company’s extension led to a delay in planning the Tana-Maragua project. On July 16, 
1936 the company rescinded its application.72  
The monopoly of power companies in East Africa was no longer untouchable. Both 
the Uganda and Kenya cases show the increased involvement of colonial administrations in 
the planning and regulation of electricity supplies. In Uganda, where European settlement 
was limited, the discussions of hydropower development centered on future industrialization. 
In Kenya, an influential settler lobby challenged the EAPLC’s attempt to meet increased 
urban demand for electricity. In both colonies, British administrators took a more active role 
in the regulation and development of electricity supplies. The onset of the Second World War 
in 1939 put on hold further investigation and planning of hydropower dams in East Africa. 
Post-Second World War Regulation and Development 
Following the Second World War, British administrators and engineers returned to a 
discussion of the role of hydropower in promoting economic development in African 
colonies. Once again, the need for postwar economic development directed attention to 
colonial development. The renewed interest in hydropower development was widespread. In 
West Africa, British engineers undertook a series of investigations of Nigerian rivers. They 
concluded that the wide variance between flood and dry weather on most Nigerian rivers 
limited the possibilities for steady power production. They did note however a number of 
sites where small hydropower facilities could operate.73 In the Gold Coast, plans focused on 
the Volta River and the construction of a large dam at Ajena.  
British administrators in East Africa also reopened discussions on the most 
economical means to develop the region’s electricity supplies. In 1946, Charles R. Westlake, 
the former chief engineer and manager for the Electricity Board for Northern Ireland, 
conducted a survey of the region’s existing electricity system so as to forecast future 
electricity demands and recommend a regulatory framework to coordinate electric plants and 
transmission networks.74 Upon his arrival in East Africa, Westlake and his team of engineers 
were confronted with the lack of staff and capacity for such a comprehensive survey. 
Without the necessary draughtsmen, surveyors, and clerks, Westlake chose to limit his 
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investigation to the most appropriate organizational structure within which to develop the 
region’s electricity supplies.75 
In September of 1946, Westlake submitted his findings to the Conference of East 
African Governors. He found the state of electricity supplies in the region “unsatisfactory.” 
In many places, provision lagged substantially behind demand, thus hindering economic 
development. He predicted that in future years the EAPLC would be unable to meet demand 
and power outages would occur. Heavy investment was needed to update existing facilities, 
extend transmission and distribution lines into new areas, and construct new hydropower and 
thermal plants. However, with the distances between potential hydropower sources and 
towns substantial, he found it uneconomical to create a comprehensive network.76 In light of 
this, Westlake drew attention to potential sites for hydropower development, namely the 
Maragua-Tana rivers (Kenya), the Victoria Nile (Uganda), and the Pangani River 
(Tanganyika). Like his predecessors, Westlake cautioned that the data available on these sites 
was preliminary, noting the “almost complete absence of hydraulic data” and the need for 
immediate gauging and surveys of the waterways under consideration.77 
On the issue of how to best regulate the region’s electricity sector and manage future 
development, Westlake differed from his predecessors. To Westlake, the value of electricity 
was not merely as a tool to stimulate economic development; he saw the provision of 
electricity as central to the social development of the region’s people. He wrote: 
Whether such schemes will be proceeded with or not must depend upon whether the 
Governments view electricity supply as a commercial service for those who can 
afford to pay for it, or as, what in truth it is, a fundamental public service vital to the 
economic and social progress of the three Territories.78 
He recommended the transfer of all licenses from private companies to a public authority, 
which he called the “East African Electricity Board.” This board would oversee the 
coordination of all electricity plants in the three colonies and the preparation of a detailed 
regional plan for electricity development. He also recommended that all power legislation 
and regulation be standardized for the three colonies.79 This was modeled on the Southern 
Rhodesian Electricity Board and was in line with what was happening in Britain, which in 
1947 passed an Electricity Act that consolidated power generation and transmission 
throughout England, previously under the control of 500 to 600 companies.80 Westlake 
concluded: “The social and economic development of East Africa requires as a first 
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consideration an abundant supply of electricity and in my view this can best be secured by 
the transferring of this service from private enterprise to public ownership.”81  
Westlake believed that state control of the sector was the first step in the creation of a 
steady and affordable electricity supply that would support industrial growth and stimulate 
increased domestic consumption. Echoing the TVA planners of the 1930s, he envisioned an 
expanded domestic market that stretched beyond the region’s cities and settler areas. He 
argued that rural electrification should be a goal of the colonial government. For example, in 
Kenya he recommended the extension of supplies from Nairobi through the settlements of 
Naivasha and Gilgil to Nakuru. “The farm lands of Kenya and elsewhere should be afforded 
an electricity supply and numerous villages should be served.”82 In addition to offering a 
“fundamental public service,” the extension of electricity into rural areas and the 
development of hydropower sources would address administrators’ concerns about the 
depletion of the region’s forests.83 As most rural electrification schemes would not be self-
supporting for many years, Westlake suggested that the government finance or provide 
private companies with guarantees for projects that would promote the economic and social 
development of colonies. 
The Westlake Report marked a shift in British attitudes towards electricity 
development in its African colonies. Following the report, an increasing number of colonial 
administrators advocated more public control of the electricity sector, thus further 
challenging the monopoly of private utility companies. Scattered throughout the report are 
complaints about the failure of the EAPLC and its subsidiaries to provide service, meet 
demand, and plan for future electricity needs.84 Westlake found the solution to this problem 
in the public ownership of existing plants and a greater role of government in the 
development of electricity plants. Secondly, while industry was still perceived as the primary 
market for electricity, Westlake presented Africans as potential consumers and advocated the 
expansion of the region’s electricity system into rural areas.  
Reactions to the Westlake Report varied. The EAPLC rebutted the claims of 
inadequate service, maintaining that their efforts to expand production and service had been 
hindered by the deprivations of the war, the increasing cost of plant materials and 
transmission lines, and African disinterest in electricity. The company continued to dismiss 
Africans as consumers. When asked about African reaction to electricity and the company’s 
street lighting programs, DARESCO Deputy General Manager N. Ramsey responded at a 
1949 meeting of the Dar es Salaam Rotary Club that “They (Africans) are quite stoic about 
it.”85 Company officials paid little attention to the developing new markets, arguing that 
investment in large-scale plants was financially imprudent.  
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Company officials also argued that environmental changes in East Africa hindered 
the present production of electricity. In Kenya, they maintained that erosion caused increased 
run-off in the wet season and reduced stream flow in the dry season. From the company’s 
perspective, this made investing in hydropower facilities risky. They offered the case of the 
Ruiru plant outside Nairobi as evidence that substantial investment in hydropower facilities 
was not the solution. The plant, originally capable of producing 220 kW of power a day at 
minimum flow, was only producing 10 kW during the dry season; company officials blamed 
this on erosion caused by forest fires.86 When East Africa experienced a series of power 
outages in 1949, the company attributed the outages to a decline in hydropower production 
due to low seasonal stream flow, a breakdown in a thermal plant, and increasing demands.87 
Westlake viewed the situation differently. He placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of 
the company who in his opinion failed “to plan ahead with any real intelligence as to future 
levels of demand.”88  
The response of colonial administrators to Westlake’s report was mixed. The Kenya 
and Tanganyika governments chose not to publish it and dismissed its recommendations.89 In 
October 1947 both governments decided that due to other project commitments (the 
Groundnut Scheme for example) and lack of capital, staff, and materials, they were not able 
to assume control over the production of electricity from the utility companies. The following 
month, the Secretary of State for the Colonies “reluctantly” agreed to the governments’ 
request, proposing a review of the situation in 1950.90 G. Wilson of the Ministry of Fuel and 
Power offered a compromise. He suggested the strengthening of Electrical Departments 
within the three territories which would then be able to increase supervision of their 
respective systems and if deemed necessary “set about development of various hydro-electric 
projects directly.”91 In both colonies, the company’s monopoly over electricity supplies was 
left unchecked.92  
In contrast, colonial administrators in Uganda reacted positively and swiftly to 
Westlake’s recommendations. In 1947, the Uganda government stepped up the planning of 
Owen Falls Dam (which had been delayed by the Second World War).93 This was followed 
in January of 1948 with the nationalization of Uganda’s electricity sector. The newly formed 
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Uganda Electricity Board (UEB), chaired by Westlake himself, assumed control of the 
planning of Owen Falls Dam and the development of the Nile waters. In late 1948, Westlake 
and three other engineers travelled to the United States to view what the British press 
heralded as “the great American counterpart [to the Owen Falls project], the Tennessee 
Valley Authority.”94 The contract for the construction of Owen Falls Dam was granted in 
September 1949 to an international consortium led by the Dutch engineering firm Christiani 
& Nielson Ltd.95  
Regardless of the rhetoric, the project was not to be Uganda’s TVA. The objective of 
Owen Falls Dam remained the production of hydropower for the industrialization of the 
protectorate, especially the mining industry near Jinja. Rather than promote rural 
electrification, which he had previously lobbied for, Westlake and the UEB found that 
supplying rural African areas with electricity was economically unwise. He explained: “Since 
there are few integrated African communities in the Protectorate, it is not possible at present 
for economic reasons to supply African houses except those places where African housing 
schemes have been built.”96 As the blueprints for the dam were drafted and construction 
began, engineers ignored the needs of Uganda’s African population.  
 Africans were not the only stakeholders whose needs were sacrificed. The project 
prompted regional discussions on the regulation of the Nile waters. Other Nile Basin 
countries raised concerns over the impact the dam would have on the amount of water 
reaching their waterways. The dominant actor in this discussion was Egypt, which received 
support from Britain. Relying on Nile waters for domestic and agricultural use, Egypt saw 
the Owen Falls Dam as a means to increase the value of Lake Victoria as a storage reservoir. 
A settlement was brokered: Egypt paid Uganda £980,000 to build the dam one meter higher, 
thus providing an additional 55 million acre-feet of stored water.97 Ethiopia was left out of 
many of these discussions.98  
The construction of the £12 million Owen Falls Dam was described by Uganda’s 
Financial Secretary in 1947 as “an act of faith.”99 When completed, the 100-feet high and 
2,500 feet long mass-concrete gravity dam was estimated to produce 150 MW. During 
construction of the dam (1951–1954), the Owen Falls project was the largest undertaking of 
its kind by the British in East Africa. Concerned that “efforts to promote social and economic 
advancement in underdeveloped countries are not sufficiently known throughout the world,” 
Britain’s Secretary of State requested more publicity of colonial economic development 
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projects worldwide. In this context, Owen Falls Dam became a symbol of British investment 
in Africa. Throughout the construction phase, administrators were urged to send pictures of 
the progress for international distribution.100 On a 1951 visit to London, Westlake held a 
press conference on the project, leading one Colonial Office official to comment that 
“Westlake [is] personally making a good impression.”101 This publicity culminated in 1954, 
when international dignitaries watched as Queen Elizabeth officially opened the dam.  
Owen Falls would be the last hydropower dam the British built in Uganda during the 
colonial period. Growing African nationalism in East Africa delayed plans for additional 
hydropower dams in the Nile Basin (the exception is Aswan in Egypt which is discussed 
below). Josiah Eccles, in a response to a 1954 paper co-authored by Westlake and presented 
at a meeting of the Institution of Civil Engineers, summarized the importance of Owen Falls 
Dam: 
the Authors would probably agree that it was in itself not a spectacular scheme in 
relation to size or to problems overcome, but to him [Eccles] it was important as a 
symbol of what could be done in a virgin country to develop the sources of power in 
nature…. Forty per cent of those resources [water-power] were in Africa, and so the 
object-lesson provided by the Paper was one which those who believed in the future 
of science and in the development of a mechanized form of civilization would 
applaud.102  
The dam had become more than a source of power; to many, it had become a symbol of the 
benefits of British colonialism in Africa. 
 
  Figure 3.  Owen Falls Dam, 1955. 
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Politicization of Dam Projects 
The jubilance over the opening of Owen Falls Dam in 1954 masked the continuing debate 
over the value of Africa’s waters and conflicts over the role of the colonial state in 
developing hydropower projects. The building of dams in Africa has always been a political 
issue. Whereas economic and ideological issues had previously shaped debates over 
hydropower development, during the 1950s political concerns came to dominate discussions. 
Kate Showers has shown how white settler states in Southern Africa used the construction of 
large dams and water transfer projects to increase regional cooperation at a time when 
African nationalist organizations were challenging their regimes.103 For example, British 
administrators weighed the costs and benefits of building a large dam at either Kariba Gorge 
(Southern Rhodesia) on the Zambezi or at Kafue Gorge on the Kafue River (Northern 
Rhodesia). In 1946, the Central African Council established a Hydro-electric Commission to 
investigate the two projects; this was followed in 1950 by an Inter-territorial Commission 
that also explored the possibility for joint development of hydropower resources.104 In 1953, 
Northern Rhodesia announced its plans to build the Kafue Dam and the formation of the 
Kafue River Hydro-Electric Authority.105 Northern Rhodesia would however be forced to 
delay construction (Stage I was completed in 1972; Stage II in 1978). By 1954, Southern 
Rhodesia (with its settler government) had the support of the World Bank to begin 
construction at the Kariba site. In 1956, construction began on Kariba Dam; the first stage 
was completed in 1959.  
As political independence approached in most British colonies in Africa, the symbolic 
importance of dams increased. From the perspective of the Colonial and Foreign Offices in 
London, the construction of hydropower dams offered concrete examples of the benefits 
British rule had bestowed on African colonies. To African nationalist leaders, such as 
Kwame Nkrumah in the Gold Coast, they offered the promise of economic development long 
delayed by colonial rule. The global political atmosphere was also changing with the United 
States and Soviet Union emerging as the two superpowers of the Cold War era. In this 
context, the funding and construction of large dams became tools used by Western and 
Eastern powers to cement political alliances with Africa’s new ruling class. Underpinning 
these political motivations were real economic concerns. With British rule on the wane in 
Africa, many feared opportunities for British engineering firms and companies might 
decrease amidst increased competition from non-British firms.  
 The case of Egypt’s Aswan High Dam points to the increasing politicization of large-
scale construction projects in Africa. In 1952 the United States and Britain pledged USD 270 
million to Egypt for the construction of the dam. After Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-
Nasser recognized the Republic of China and negotiated with Czechoslovakia, in 1956 
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Britain and the United States withdrew funding. Nasser found a willing partner for the 
project in the Soviet Union, which funded about a third of the project’s construction costs.106 
This did not go unnoticed by other African nationalist leaders. In 1951, the newly elected 
Gold Coast Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah lobbied for the construction of the Volta River 
Project. The VRP included the 80-meter high Akosombo Dam, the construction of a harbor at 
Tema, and the construction of smaller dams and power stations. The main purpose of the 
VRP was to produce electricity for the smelting of bauxite into aluminum.107 Nkrumah made 
the Volta River Project a key component of his nationalist campaign. Following Ghana’s 
independence in 1957, amidst American and British fears that Ghana would align itself with 
the USSR or nationalize the Volta River Project (VRP), Nkrumah leveraged Soviet interest in 
the project in order to solidify American and British financial commitments. In October 
1958, Nkrumah warned “either we shall modernize with your [US and UK] interests and 
support—or we shall be compelled to turn elsewhere.”108  
A proposal for the construction of Sierra Leone’s Guma Valley Dam further 
illustrates the intersection between the changing political context, British paternalism, and 
economic interests during the final days of colonial rule. British officials believed the 160-
feet earth dam located eight miles from Freetown would increase Freetown’s water supplies 
and provide the electricity supplies necessary to stimulate industrial development. More 
importantly perhaps, the project offered the British an opportunity to showcase the benefits 
of British rule while supporting British engineering and manufacturing interests. A.M. 
Macleod-Smith, Sierra Leone’s Minister of Finance, wrote to the Colonial Office in 1960:  
The scheme is absolutely essential to any further development of Sierra Leone and it 
would seem to us to be quite deplorable if Sierra Leone becomes independent without 
the British at least having taken the final steps to get this scheme underway. It is, 
however, quite clear that this is the last chance of getting the scheme completed under 
British auspices.109 
British officials expressed concern that time was running out. With Sierra Leone’s 
independence nearing, little time remained for the Protectorate to receive a Colonial 
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Development Committee grant.110 Moreover, officials noted that West German firms were 
interested in financing and constructing the scheme. The Protectorate’s governor predicted 
that if the scheme did not go forward “Sierra Leone’s reputation in London would take a 
severe knock and we should lose some of the confidence we have built up.”111 
In East Africa, debate centered on the most economical way to meet the region’s 
increased demand for electricity, especially in the greater Nairobi metropolitan area. 
Following the opening of Owen Falls Dam, the Uganda Electricity Board lobbied for the 
construction of additional dams on the Nile and the establishment of a 275,000-volt 
transmission line between Jinja and Nairobi. Citing the existence of almost sixty years of 
data on the river, the UEB suggested developing Ugandan sites would “save time” and allow 
construction to proceed. 112 In addition, in 1956 the British engineering firm of Kennedy & 
Donkin reported to the UEB that the least costly means to meet Nairobi’s power needs was 
the purchase of electricity from Uganda.113  
Supporters of the Nile projects in Uganda pointed to the feeling some had that Kenya 
had been privileged in relation to Uganda by London-based administrators. Amar Maini, an 
official in the Ministry of Corporations and Regional Community in Uganda, wrote to the 
Colonial Office: 
There are two political aspects which, however, I feel I ought to bring to your notice. 
There has been a lot of unofficial opinion in Uganda which has maintained that the 
stable political conditions of Uganda have not received the sympathetic support in 
regard to loans and financial assistance that is deserved. Comparisons are odious, but 
comparisons are made with Kenya and other similar territories. Also, concern of 
political reactions if Uganda was prevented a CDC loan with no other alternative 
[exists].114 
Kenyan officials and settlers reacted to Uganda’s position by raising a number of political 
and economic concerns. Firstly, they remained wary about creating a situation in which 
Kenya was dependent on independent Uganda for power. Phillip Mitchell, the East Africa 
Power and Lighting Company Chairman, wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
expressing these concerns: “the Co. did not wish to become dependent on Power from 
Uganda, since they feared the advent of a nationalist government in that territory, which 
would probably nationalize Power supplies.”115 Ugandan officials dismissed this concern, 
highlighting the fact that the Protectorate depended on access to Kenya’s railways and ports 
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for its entire import and export sector.116 In terms of economic viability, the EAPLC 
challenged the cost-benefit analysis of the UEB’s consulting engineers. They remained 
convinced that upon completion (in 3–4 years) the Seven Forks Dam would provide Kenya 
with a cheaper and more stable power supply.117 Furthermore, proponents of the Seven Forks 
Dam argued that the dam would provide not only electricity to Kenya’s urban and industrial 
centers, but that its reservoir would provide water for agricultural development.118  
By the mid-1950s, planners in East Africa argued that more attention be paid to the 
multipurpose use of waterways. In 1954, H.A. Morrice, an irrigation advisor on the Nile, 
noted: “It is desirable that all development plans for the main Nile should be designed to 
serve as many useful purposes as possible.”119 That same year the government of 
Tanganyika commissioned the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to 
complete an extensive survey of the territory’s largest river basin, the Rufiji Basin. The goal 
of the survey was to propose future irrigation, flood control, and reclamation projects.120 
Conducted by an international team of experts, the FAO survey was evidence of Britain’s 
changing role in colonial development. By the late 1950s as African colonies neared political 
independence, international funding and engineering firms assumed a larger role in the 
economic development of former colonies. Multinational institutions, such as the FAO and 
World Bank, and bilateral aid agencies promoted hydropower dams as central to economic 
growth.121 With the support of these funders, Africa was ready to enter the Big Dam era. 
Conclusion  
Beginning in the 1920s, British planners turned to imperial waterways to produce the 
electricity needed to support postwar economic recovery. This led to fierce debate within 
Britain and her colonies over the role of government in the development and regulation of 
electricity supply systems. In Britain’s African colonies, administrators argued that the 
industrial and domestic markets needed to justify large capital investment in electricity 
production and distribution did not yet exist. From their perspective, Africans were not 
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potential consumers. They advocated for colony-specific or regional investigations of 
potential hydropower sources. Referencing American river basin projects like the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, some British engineers advocated greater government control of electricity 
systems. Following the Second World War, more attention was devoted to the “electricity 
question.” As both the demand for electricity and independence were on the rise during the 
1950s, British engineers oversaw the construction of the Owen Falls Dam in Uganda and the 
Kariba Dam in Southern Rhodesia. In other colonies, engineers stepped up efforts to map 
waterways and plan multipurpose dams. The coming of political independence in the late 
1950s and early 1960s and the increased involvement of international development 
institutions decreased the role of British engineers in harnessing Africa’s waters.   
Colonial attitudes towards the role of electricity in African colonies and colonial 
hydrological surveys shaped the contours of Africa’s current electricity problems. At home in 
Britain, planners and engineers challenged the power of utility companies in electricity 
production, transmission, and production, and eventually nationalized the electric supply 
system in 1948. Although aware of these debates about electricity, most colonial planners 
and engineers did not advocate such a reorganization of colonial electricity systems. Rather, 
administrators were content to turn over the production and distribution of electricity to 
private companies that defined the value of electricity in terms of industrial production. To 
colonial planners and utility company officials alike, Africans were not perceived to be 
potential consumers. Therefore, efforts to develop domestic markets for electricity were 
limited to cities and areas of European settlement.  
At the 1966 opening of the Akosombo Dam, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah 
recalled the project’s colonial roots, noting that “some colonial exploiters had fancied a sort 
of hydro-electric enterprise on the Volta.”122 To Nkrumah, the dam was evidence of Ghana’s 
independence and modernization—a symbol of the New Africa emerging in the 1960s. 
Although constructed during the postcolonial period, the dam materialized after decades of 
debate among colonial planners, international engineers, private companies, and the World 
Bank. In terms of electricity policies and hydropower development, independence may have 
changed the key actors, but it has done little to dislodge the belief that the course to economic 
development is fueled by hydropower. Africa’s first generation of political leaders set about 
turning colonial blueprints into concrete structures. Unfortunately, they too privileged the 
production of electricity for industrial purposes rather than domestic consumption. 
Connecting rural communities to the developing national electricity grids was viewed as not 
cost effective. With political power increasingly situated in Africa’s growing cities, most 
rural Africans remain without access to affordable electricity.  
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